fix(auth): explicit Validation::new(Algorithm::HS256) + mint iss/aud/nbf claims #406

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YousifShkara merged 2 commits from fix/MAPPS-334-explicit-validation-secret-floor-v2 into main

2026-06-30 07:56:33 +02:00

YousifShkara commented

2026-06-30 05:46:39 +02:00

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MAPPS-334 (step 1 of 2): close the alg-confusion door + prepare for strict iss/aud validation.

decode_token previously used Validation::default(). That defaults to HS256 today, but the default is set by jsonwebtoken and can drift on a future dep bump; pin Algorithm::HS256 explicitly so the protocol contract is greppable and stable. Set validate_exp = true (already implicit) and add a 30s leeway to match the Bunyip RS verifier.

Mint side now stamps iss = "mokosh-server", aud = "mokosh-server", and nbf = iat on every access + refresh token. The new fields land on JwtClaims with #[serde(default)] so any in-flight legacy token that lacks them still deserializes - no rolling-deploy 401 storm.

iss / aud validation is NOT pinned in this PR. Flipping it on today would 401 every legacy access + refresh token in flight (they were minted without the claims) and force a re-login storm. The follow-up ticket flips strict validation after the rolling refresh-TTL window (~30 days post-merge) has rotated every live token through the new mint path.

JWT_SECRET length floor (32 bytes outside dev) already exists in src/main.rs (PMS-499); no change needed.

#MAPPS-334

MAPPS-334 (step 1 of 2): close the alg-confusion door + prepare for strict iss/aud validation. `decode_token` previously used `Validation::default()`. That defaults to HS256 today, but the default is set by jsonwebtoken and can drift on a future dep bump; pin `Algorithm::HS256` explicitly so the protocol contract is greppable and stable. Set `validate_exp = true` (already implicit) and add a 30s `leeway` to match the Bunyip RS verifier. Mint side now stamps `iss = "mokosh-server"`, `aud = "mokosh-server"`, and `nbf = iat` on every access + refresh token. The new fields land on `JwtClaims` with `#[serde(default)]` so any in-flight legacy token that lacks them still deserializes - no rolling-deploy 401 storm. iss / aud validation is NOT pinned in this PR. Flipping it on today would 401 every legacy access + refresh token in flight (they were minted without the claims) and force a re-login storm. The follow-up ticket flips strict validation after the rolling refresh-TTL window (~30 days post-merge) has rotated every live token through the new mint path. JWT_SECRET length floor (32 bytes outside dev) already exists in src/main.rs (PMS-499); no change needed. #MAPPS-334

YousifShkara self-assigned this

2026-06-30 05:46:39 +02:00

YousifShkara added 1 commit

2026-06-30 05:46:39 +02:00

fix(auth): explicit Validation::new(Algorithm::HS256) + mint iss/aud/nbf claims

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ab59925556

MAPPS-334 (step 1 of 2): close the alg-confusion door + prepare for strict iss/aud validation.

`decode_token` previously used `Validation::default()`. That defaults to HS256 today, but the default is set by jsonwebtoken and can drift on a future dep bump; pin `Algorithm::HS256` explicitly so the protocol contract is greppable and stable. Set `validate_exp = true` (already implicit) and add a 30s `leeway` to match the Bunyip RS verifier.

Mint side now stamps `iss = "mokosh-server"`, `aud = "mokosh-server"`, and `nbf = iat` on every access + refresh token. The new fields land on `JwtClaims` with `#[serde(default)]` so any in-flight legacy token that lacks them still deserializes - no rolling-deploy 401 storm.

iss / aud validation is NOT pinned in this PR. Flipping it on today would 401 every legacy access + refresh token in flight (they were minted without the claims) and force a re-login storm. The follow-up ticket flips strict validation after the rolling refresh-TTL window (~30 days post-merge) has rotated every live token through the new mint path.

JWT_SECRET length floor (32 bytes outside dev) already exists in src/main.rs (PMS-499); no change needed.

#MAPPS-334

YousifShkara added 1 commit

2026-06-30 07:36:45 +02:00

fix(auth): disable validate_aud until strict iss/aud flip lands

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92ed8c1d40

`Validation::new(Algorithm::HS256)` defaults `validate_aud = true` with no allowed-aud set. Newly minted tokens carry `aud = "mokosh-server"` (per the previous commit on this PR), so decode rejects them with `InvalidAudience` before the deferred strict-flip ticket ever lands. The integration suite caught it: every `tests/approvals_polymorphic.rs::*` round-trip 401s at the auth boundary instead of hitting the handler.

Set `validation.validate_aud = false` explicitly so the deferred-flip posture documented on the previous commit (iss / aud minted now, validated strictly in a follow-up ticket after the rolling refresh-TTL window) actually holds. The follow-up ticket flips it back on and pins `aud` + `iss` to `MOKOSH_JWT_AUDIENCE` / `MOKOSH_JWT_ISSUER`.

#MAPPS-334

YousifShkara merged commit 3bafb3c899 into main

2026-06-30 07:56:33 +02:00

YousifShkara deleted branch fix/MAPPS-334-explicit-validation-secret-floor-v2

2026-06-30 07:56:33 +02:00

YousifShkara referenced this pull request from a commit

2026-06-30 07:56:34 +02:00

Merge pull request 'fix(auth): explicit Validation::new(Algorithm::HS256) + mint iss/aud/nbf claims' (#406) from fix/MAPPS-334-explicit-validation-secret-floor-v2 into main