fix(auth): close SSO/OIDC auth-strength and conformance gaps #202
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Delete branch "feat/pms-191-sso-oidc-security-gaps"
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Mint first-party tokens with the originating session's real acr/amr instead of a hardcoded pwd LoA, so MFA and trust-bypass sessions are reported accurately at login (auth.rs) and on tenant switch (tenants.rs looks the OP session up by sid to preserve its strength).
Enforce OIDC prompt and grant-type rules at /authorize: honor prompt=login by forcing re-auth before reusing an existing session, reject clients lacking the authorization_code grant with unauthorized_client before a code is minted, and remove the unreachable prompt=none block by checking it before the session unwrap.
Expose the authz-gating mokosh_active_tenant claim at /userinfo and advertise it in discovery claims_supported.
Verify feedback bearer tokens with EdDSA and an at+jwt typ check (was RS256, which never validated, silently treating signed-in callers as anonymous).
Record the ambiguous-email, no-such-user, and inactive-status audit events in verify_only so its failure trail matches login.
Revoke each session's refresh families on user suspend and delete, so a stolen refresh token cannot outlive the account.
#PMS-191